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Can vocal conditioning trigger a
semiotic ratchet in marmosets?
Hjalmar K. Turesson and Sidarta Ribeiro*
Brain Institute, Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte, Natal, Brazil
The complexity of human communication has often been taken as evidence that our
language reflects a true evolutionary leap, bearing little resemblance to any other
animal communication system. The putative uniqueness of the human language poses
serious evolutionary and ethological challenges to a rational explanation of human
communication. Here we review ethological, anatomical, molecular, and computational
results across several species to set boundaries for these challenges. Results from
animal behavior, cognitive psychology, neurobiology, and semiotics indicate that human
language shares multiple features with other primate communication systems, such
as specialized brain circuits for sensorimotor processing, the capability for indexical
(pointing) and symbolic (referential) signaling, the importance of shared intentionality for
associative learning, affective conditioning and parental scaffolding of vocal production.
The most substantial differences lie in the higher human capacity for symbolic
compositionality, fast vertical transmission of new symbols across generations, and
irreversible accumulation of novel adaptive behaviors (cultural ratchet). We hypothesize
that increasingly-complex vocal conditioning of an appropriate animal model may be
sufficient to trigger a semiotic ratchet, evidenced by progressive sign complexification, as
spontaneous contact calls become indexes, then symbols and finally arguments (strings
of symbols). To test this hypothesis, we outline a series of conditioning experiments in the
common marmoset (Callithrix jacchus). The experiments are designed to probe the limits
of vocal communication in a prosocial, highly vocal primate 35 million years far from the
human lineage, so as to shed light on the mechanisms of semiotic complexification and
cultural transmission, and serve as a naturalistic behavioral setting for the investigation of
language disorders.
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Introduction
Since Darwin’s (1872) comparative study of emotions, psychological continuity across species has
been a dominant view in biology. However, the complexity of human communication has often been
taken as evidence that our language reflects a true evolutionary leap, bearing little resemblance to
any other animal communication system (Tomasello and Call, 1997; Tomasello, 1999). Scientists
have argued bitterly over whether animals possess language or not (Marler, 1970; Griffin, 1984;
Savage-Rumbaugh, 1990; Pepperberg et al., 1997; Gelman and Gallistel, 2004; Tomasello et al.,
2005). Throughout most of the past century, the putative uniqueness of our language posed serious
evolutionary and ethological challenges to a rational explanation of human communication. How
did the phonology, syntax and semantics of human language evolve if apes, our closest relatives,
appear to be so laconic?
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Yet, the increasingly better sampling of animal behavior in
the past decades showed that apes and other primates possess
vocal referential communication (e.g., Seyfarth et al., 1980),
cultural transmission (e.g., Whiten et al., 1999), and even simple
combinatorial syntax (e.g., Ouattara et al., 2009). We actually
share with certain mammalian and avian species the fundamental
sensorimotor mechanisms required for the perceptual and motor
aspects of vocal learning (Petkov and Jarvis, 2012), such as
the expression in cortico-striatal and cortico-cerebellar circuits
of transcription factor FOXP2, which regulates the normal
development of human speech (Konopka et al., 2009; Scharff
and Petri, 2011). A comprehensive computational analysis of
gene expression profiles measured in various brain regions
recently allowed for the identification of several functionally and
molecularly analogous brain regions for birdsong and human
speech (Pfenning et al., 2014). Nevertheless, it remains unclear
why have other animals failed to evolve the higher traits of human
language.
To shed light on this problem, we begin by reviewing
the contributions of semiotics to the problem of vocal
communication. Next we review the empirical literature on
vocal learning across species, with a focus on the comparison
between New and OldWorld primates. Finally, we present a series
of ongoing experiments aimed at probing the semiotic limits of
vocal communication in marmosets.
Meaning by Resemblance: Iconic
Representations
Semiotics is the logical system developed by Peirce (1958, 1998)
to formally describe the communication of an object to an
interpretant by way of a sign. In this system, the relationship
between sign and object strictly derives from three—and only
three—different kinds of mental processes for the establishment
of meaning: icon, index or symbol.
If a sign resembles the physical properties of an object, it is said
to be an icon of this object. If a sign has spatio-temporal contiguity
with an object, it is said to be an index of this object. If a sign
represents an object by an entirely arbitrary rule or convention
established among interpreters, it is said to be a symbol of that
object (Peirce, 1958, 1998). A critical difference between an index
and a symbol is that the former requires the simultaneous presence
of the object, while the latter often occurs in the complete absence
of the object. No other categories exist beyond these three, and by
definition, a sign must belong to at least one of them.
Icons are the simplest form of sign, because they convey
meaning through the sheer physical similarity with the object,
without the need of further abstraction. Arguably, iconic
communication would not be simple and perhaps not even
possible if parts of the brain did not represent perceptual
information in an iconic manner (Ribeiro, 2010). Visual, auditory
and somatosensory inputs ascend from the periphery to the
central nervous system in a quite organized manner, leading
to orderly topographic maps in primary sensory thalamus and
neocortex for positions in physical space (Hubel and Wiesel,
1959), sound frequencies in acoustic space (Hind, 1953), and
locations along the body surface (Mountcastle, 1957; Mountcastle
et al., 1957; Simons and Woolsey, 1979). As a consequence,
object representations in these early processing areas are largely
congruent with the objects represented. A well-known example of
this feature was provided by the use of 2-deoxyglucose uptake by
stimulated neural tissue to imprint a visual grid on the primary
visual cortex of macaque monkeys (Tootell et al., 1982). While
the experiment revealed the high degree of isomorphism between
stimulus and response, it also made explicit that this response is
modified by the cortical magnification factor that over-represents
the center of the visual field in detriment of the periphery.
Another telling example of the interplay between iconic
representations and hardwired filters for ecologically-relevant
stimuli can be found in the canary, a seasonal songbird with a
characteristic syllable repertoire. The caudomedial nidopallium
(NCM) of the canary, an auditory region homologous to the
mammalian primary auditory cortex, responds to natural canary
whistles according to their frequencies, with low-pitched whistles
mapping dorsally inNCM, and graduallymore ventralmapping as
the pitch increases (Ribeiro et al., 1998). Yet NCM cannot be said
to be strictly tonotopic, because artificial stimuli with the same
fundamental frequency fail to produce awell-localized response in
NCM: computer generated tones activate more diffuse groups of
neurons, and guitar notes stripped of their harmonics even more
so, without any clear topography. Thus, NCM is “whistletopic”
rather than tonotopic, i.e., it carries an orderly representation of
the environment that is clearly tuned to the acoustic features of
natural stimuli.
If iconic representations in primary cortical areas are more
the rule than the exception, examples of iconic communication
among non-human animals are not compelling. Inter-specific
communication by sheer vocal imitation (Owen-Ashley et al.,
2002) is rare; for instance, to date there is no evidence that animals
produce onomatopoeic alarm calls to warn against predators.
Still, the notion that onomatopoeias played an important role
in the early evolution of words is tempting, with old roots
in philosophy and linguistics (von Humboldt, 1836; Jakobson
and Waugh, 1979; Hinton et al., 1994; Magnus, 2010), and
fresh support from studies of infant psychology (Maurer et al.,
2006; Imai et al., 2008; Kita et al., 2010) and neuroscience
(Osaka et al., 2004; Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006; Garcia et al., 2014).
Judgment of this issue is tied to the relatively recent advent of
computer-aided devices to investigate spontaneous behavior of
other species in the field. As more studies with better recording
techniques are performed, discoveries regarding the natural use
of iconic communication may still lead to substantially different
conclusions.
Meaning by Spatio-Temporal Contiguity: To
Point, to Look, to Indicate
In comparisonwith icons, indexes constitute amuchmore flexible
type of sign, since the same pointer can be used to mean an
endless variety of different objects. The highly informative act
of indicating with the finger or gaze is so ubiquitous across
different human cultures that one must conclude that its origins
are ancient in theHomo lineage. Indeed, indexes are far frombeing
exclusive of human communication. A number of studies suggest
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that chimps are capable of taking conspecifics gaze direction into
account (Call et al., 1998; Hare et al., 2000, 2001). Apes can
also follow human pointing, given appropriate methodologies
and/or human exposure (Mulcahy and Call, 2009; Lyn et al.,
2010; Leavens et al., 2012; Hopkins et al., 2013). Rhesus monkeys
follow both human pointing and gaze (Hauser et al., 2007), and
even corvids have been shown to follow gaze (Bugnyar et al.,
2004; Bugnyar, 2011). The fact that human pointing is followed
by domesticated dogs and foxes (Hare et al., 1998, 2002, 2005;
Hare and Tomasello, 1999), as well as trained dolphins (Pack
and Herman, 2004), suggests that indexical learning can be
greatly boosted within a few generations by trait selection, and
even within a single generation, by learning from interactions
with point users (e.g., human trainers). Altogether, these studies
indicate that the capacity for index-based communication is
widespread and therefore not a suitable candidate to explain
the uniqueness of human language. But it may well be that
quantitative differences in the ability to use indexes (Goldin-
Meadow, 2007), supported by a large repertoire of arbitrary vocal
calls (Ghazanfar et al., 2007), allowed our hominid ancestors
to initiate the cultural ratchet that led to contemporary human
language.
Indexes are very useful to signal to other individuals
the presence of conspecifics, predators, preys, or feeding
opportunities, and therefore a likely preadaptation of indexical
communication is prosociality, i.e., the ability to display behaviors
that favor other individuals even in the absence of immediate self-
benefit. Prosociality is a widely distributed trait amongmammals,
from rats (Daniel, 1942; Ben-Ami Bartal, 2011; Márquez et al.,
2015) to apes (Horner et al., 2011; von Rohr et al., 2012; Hobaiter
and Byrne, 2014; Hobaiter et al., 2014).
Yet, as prosocial as apes can be, they seem to have little
capacity for using indexes to share intentions on the execution
of collaborative activities (Warneken et al., 2006; but see
Leavens et al., 2005). Several researchers have proposed that
the key difference between humans and non-humans is shared
intentionality, a cornerstone of our exquisite ability to teach
and learn, able to create a cultural ratchet that leads to the
fast transmission of any useful cultural innovation (reviewed
in Tomasello et al., 2005). Joint attention in humans begins at
9–12 months with gaze following, the use of adults for social
reference, and the imitation of adult gestures (Bakeman and
Adamson, 1984; Moore and Dunham, 1995). The understanding
that there are other minds begins as babies start to recognize
voluntary behaviors with overt or covert goals (Meltzoff, 1988;
Carpenter et al., 1995, 1998). As children develop, adults become
outside entities whose attention can be called, both as observers
of the child’s actions and as producers of behaviors desired by
the child. Lack of shared intentionality and deficits in index usage
seem to be an important component in autism (Tomasello et al.,
2005).
Point following and the partaking of goals appears to be
a bottleneck for the learning of indexical signs, and for this
reason we designed experiments to quantitatively assess the
conditions that allow shared intentionality to arise between pairs
of independent vocal agents, either overtly or covertly. These
experiments are detailed below, but before they are properly
introduced it is necessary to present the quite controversial topic
of symbolic communication.
Meaning by Convention: Are We the
Symbolic Species?
The search for the key difference between human language and
the communication systems in other species led to the proposal
that the use of symbols is the distinctive property that sets
us apart from the other animals (Deacon, 1998). According
to this view, non-human animals are limited to iconic and
indexical communication, and therefore utterly incapable of using
symbols, the most powerful and flexible sign type. Supposedly
the “symbolic species hypothesis” is grounded on the Peircean
semiotics, but a closer inspection of semiotics shows that the
definition of symbol entirely matches the empirical evidence of
referential communication observed in different animal species.
Chimpanzees in captivity can learn to useman-made lexigrams
to refer to dozens of different objects and actions (Savage-
Rumbaugh et al., 1986; Gillespie-Lynch et al., 2014), effectively
expanding their ability to communicate with caregivers and
experimenters. However, it has been argued that lexigram use by
chimpanzees does not represent true symbolic communication,
but rather functional communication based on the instrumental
learning of the specific contingencies of the experimental setting
(Seidenberg and Petitto, 1987).
Field studies of spontaneous animal communication effectively
bypass this concern. Adult vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus
aethiops), Old World primates from the African savannahs,
naturally display three kinds of alarm calls that correspond
specifically to the presence of terrestrial, aerial or slithering
predators. Upon hearing alarm calls uttered by an adult, other
adult monkeys will promptly react to protect themselves, hiding
above or below trees in the case of aerial or terrestrial predators,
respectively, or moving aside and scanning the ground in the
case of snakes. Juvenile vervet monkeys are able to emit the
same vocalizations but do so out of context, and therefore do not
produce escape reactions in the adults.
Field observation of vervet monkey behavior argues strongly
for the symbolic quality of alarm calls among adults (Struhsaker,
1967; Seyfarth et al., 1980). First, the proper context of use of these
calls is slowly learned by repeated pairing of alarm call (auditory
stimulus) and predator (visual and/or olfactory stimulus),
denoting the gradual establishment of a social convention
regarding the interpretation of these alarms. Second, experimental
playbacks of these alarm calls produce proper escape reactions
in the absence of any predator among adults, exemplifying a
trademark of symbolic communication, namely that meaning is
conveyed in the absence of the object (Seyfarth andCheney, 1988).
Comparable communication systems have been documented in
close relatives, Campbell’s monkeys (Cercopithecus campbelli) and
Diana monkeys (Cercopithecus diana; Zuberbühler, 2000, 2001).
More recently, field research of chimpanzees revealed the use of
intentional calls to warn against a predator model (Schel et al.,
2013).
Computational simulations of the interactions of artificial
creatures representing vocalizing preys and their predators
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suggest that the referential code that ascribes specific meaning to
each call type arises by chance, through random variations that get
to be established and maintained over time. This occurs when the
prey-predatory ratio is sufficiently large for the prey population to
survive long enough for the establishment and spread of the code
(Queiroz and Ribeiro, 2002; Gudwin et al., 2003; Loula et al., 2004;
Ribeiro et al., 2007).
Since the original findings in vervet monkeys, the occurrence
of referential communication regarding specific predator types
(Macedonia and Evans, 1993) has been demonstrated in a variety
of non-primate species, including ground squirrels (Spermophilus
spp.; Owings and Hennessy, 1984), chickens (Gallus gallus
domesticus; Gyger et al., 1987; Evans and Evans, 1999), prairie
dogs (Cynomys gunnisoni; Slobodchikoff et al., 1991; Kiriazis and
Slobodchikoff, 2006), tree squirrels (Tamiasciurus hudsonicus
Greene and Meagher, 1998), dwarf mongooses (Helogale
undulata; Beynon and Rasa, 1989), suricates (Suricata suricatta;
Manser, 2001; Manser et al., 2001). Similarly, bottlenosed
dolphins have been reported to understand human gestures as
symbolic representations of body parts (Herman et al., 2001).
Altogether, the empirical and computational results of
referential communication among a wide variety of species
clearly contend against the notion that humans are the only
species to employ symbols. Rather, referential communication in
non-human species conform to the notion of dicent symbol in
Peircean semiotics, i.e., a symbol that functions “like an index”
because its object is “a general interpreted as an existent” (Peirce,
1998). In the semiotic framework, what distinguishes human
language from the communication system of other species is our
ability to concatenate symbols of symbols of symbols, namely
what Peirce labeled “argument.”
How Informative is the Structure of
Arguments?
Several animal species use sequences of vocalizations to
communicate. Notably, birdsong is typically composed of a
sequence of phrases, each comprising a string of repeated
syllables (Williams and Staples, 1992). In many species, adult
males display a stable sequence of vocalizations, with little
variation from bout to bout within a season (e.g., canary:
Nottebohm et al., 1981) or even across seasons (e.g., zebra-finch:
Walton et al., 2012), especially when singing toward a female
(Sossinka and Bohner, 1980).
In extreme cases, like in the nightingale, the huge size of
the syllabic repertoire leads to a very flexible display (Hultsch
et al., 2004). Likewise, mockingbirds have the ability to mimic the
vocalizations of other species, resulting in very complex sequences
akin to improvisation (Derrickson, 1987). Nevertheless, little or
no meaning seems to be ascribed to phrase order, with the clear
exception of introductory notes (Price, 1979), which may indicate
whether animals are singing directly to a conspecific, or singing
alone (Jarvis et al., 1998).
There is no indication that songbirds can shuffle phrases to
generate a combinatorial reference code. In fact, this ability
seems to be exceedingly rare, uniquely human if not for the
(rather limited) example of compositionality in some Old-World
primates, such as the putty-nosed monkey (Cercopithecus
nictitans), which can employ two vocalizations in a combinatorial
manner (Arnold and Zuberbühler, 2006). With the sole exception
of suffix usage among Cercopithecines (Ouattara et al., 2009;
Coye et al., 2015), and human-tutored apes (Savage-Rumbaugh
et al., 1986) and dolphins (Richards et al., 1984), symbolic
arguments seem to be exclusively humans.
The notion that the structure of arguments carries important
information is tightly linked to graph theory, which deals with
networks of interconnected elements, such as successive words
during a conversation. Graph theory was initiated by Leonhard
Euler in the eighteenth century, and was greatly developed
in the twentieth century (Bollobás, 1998) with ever-expanding
applications in physics, chemistry, biology and indeed any field
in which networks play a key role (Milo et al., 2002; Sporns,
2010). In the context of vocal communication, a graph represents
the temporal sequence of vocalizations, with each vocalization
represented as a node, and the transition between consecutive
vocalizations represented as a directed edge (Ferrer I Cancho
and Solé, 2001). The overarching applicability of graph theory
to communication suggests that it is particularly well suited
to causally bridge very different levels of description of the
phenomenon, such as systems neurophysiology and linguistics.
If activity within an interconnected network of neurons is very
aptly described as a directed graph (Changeux, 1997), so is
the sequential production of utterances that characterize vocal
communication in general, or human language in particular.
The usefulness of structural speech features to discriminate
pathological and non-pathological reports has recently been
demonstrated. Specific graph attributes allow the quantitative
discrimination of schizophrenic versusmanic subjects, evenwhen
non-psychotic subjects are included in the sample (Mota et al.,
2012, 2014). Similar analyses successfully discriminate patients
with Alzheimer’s disease from patients with mild cognitive
impairment (Bertola et al., 2014). Overall the results indicate
that the graph-theoretical analysis of vocalizations is key to the
study of language-related deficits in humans, and may have
major applicability in animal models of diseases such as autism,
such as the marmoset (Shen, 2013). Effective screening for
phenotypes of interest may be provided by semiotic experiments
based on conditioning (Figure 1), designed to track essential
quantitative differences in the structure of vocalizations as they
become indexes, then dicent symbols, and possibly arguments
(Figure 2). Before proceeding to the explanation of these
experiments and to the justification of the choice of marmosets, it
is important to review the known boundaries of vocal learning in
primates.
Vocal Flexibility in Non-Human Primates
For symbolic communication to be powerful (i.e., communicate a
great number of objects), and/or flexible (i.e., communicate new
objects), two aspects must concur. First, the ability to learn to
interpret new symbols. Second, the ability to use and produce
new symbols for adaptive operation within a given context. While
there is plenty of evidence of the former (Savage-Rumbaugh
et al., 1978; Savage-Rumbaugh and Romsky, 1989; Gelman and
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FIGURE 1 | Basic conditioning paradigm. The delay between vocalization and reward was fixed at 2 s.
Gallistel, 2004), examples of the latter are substantially more
limited among non-human primates. Below we briefly review
the findings on primate vocal flexibility, understood as the
adaptive, cognitively mediated control over vocal production,
comprising usage learning, production learning, and acoustic
modifications in the presence of noise (Seyfarth and Cheney,
2010).
Vocal Production Learning in Non-Human
Primates
Vocal production learning refers to the ability to learn to produce
a new vocalization. This can be a modification of a vocalization
already in the animal’s repertoire, or the production of an
entirely new vocalization. Historically, the focus has been on
entirely new vocalizations since it is hard to ensure that what
appears to be a modified vocalization is not merely a preexisting
vocalization that simply was not experimentally observed before
(and thus only a matter of usage learning; Janik and Slater, 1997,
2000; Tyack, 2008). Among mammals, imitation of completely
novel, often anthropogenic, sounds has only been reported for
dolphins, elephants, harbor seals, and humans (Tyack, 2008).
However, this narrow way of studying vocal production learning
inadvertently excludes many species that at a closer look display
modifications of vocalizations beyond the solely motivational or
developmental.
One such (subtle) type of vocal modification is the convergence
of calls, which takes place when some acoustic features of
different individuals’ calls converge, often as new social groups
form. This has been reported in several species, and among
them, primates. In two influential studies Snowdon and Elowson
(1999) demonstrated that certain acoustic features of the trill
calls produced by pygmy marmosets (Cebuella pygmaea)—an
intragroup communication call, apparently used for maintaining
group cohesion (Snowdon and Hodun, 1981)—converged after
different groups were placed in a common acoustic environment
(Elowson and Snowdon, 1994), as well as when individuals
were paired (Snowdon and Elowson, 1999). This suggests that
pygmy marmosets indeed have some capacity for learning their
vocal production, expressed in response to changes in social
environments. Similar findings have followed, demonstrating for
example the convergence of food grunts after the merging of two
chimpanzee groups (Watson et al., 2015), and the convergence of
pant hoots (a long distance call) to a version shared within the
group (Marshall et al., 1999).
Thus, it seems that non-human primates might be capable of
vocal production learning, and thus have more vocal flexibility
than what was apparent when using the ability to imitate novel
vocalizations as a strict requirement (Elowson and Snowdon,
1994; Marshall et al., 1999; Snowdon and Elowson, 1999;
Watson et al., 2015). However, the above-mentioned acoustic
modifications are subtle, and possibly caused by other factors than
learning. Thus, the hard evidence has to be carefully examined,
and followed up by better-controlled studies able to rule out
the possible confounds. The next section presents some of these
confounds.
Vocal Usage in Non-Human Primates
Learning in which context to produce a call is often labeled vocal
usage learning and it demonstrates a degree of cognitive control
over vocalizations. This kind of vocal flexibility is generally
studied with conditioning experiments in which the animal is
rewarded for producing calls (any call or a particular type of
call). Several studies have presented results suggesting that non-
human primates can be conditioned to produce at least some types
of vocalizations in response to particular contexts (Sutton et al.,
1973; Pierce, 1985; Hihara et al., 2003; Hage et al., 2013), while
others have reported failures (Yamaguchi andMyers, 1972; Aitken
and Wilson, 1979).
A classic and often cited study offered food reward to three
juvenile rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) for producing more
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FIGURE 2 | Semiotic experiments using conditioned marmoset vocalizations. Does social identity matter for each of the experiments? Learning curves are
expected to be steeper and shorter when the interacting animals are from the same family. (A) Mimicking experiment: Marmoset 2 will be rewarded only when able to
deliver the same kind of vocalization produced by marmoset 1 (e.g., phee, in blue). (B) Soft generosity experiment: Marmoset 1 will be rewarded when marmoset 2 is
rewarded after a correct vocalization. (C) Hard generosity experiment: When marmoset 2 produces the correct vocalization, only marmoset 1 will be rewarded. (D)
Envy experiment: Marmoset 1 will get double reward when marmoset 2 is rewarded after a correct vocalization. (E) Collaboration experiment: The two marmosets
will be rewarded only when able to deliver the same kind of vocalization in close temporal proximity. Can the task be built with several animals in tandem? (F)
Competition experiment: A properly-timed vocalization by marmoset 2 will allow it to steal the reward from marmoset 1, and vice versa. How many turn-taking will be
reached as a function of kinship and satiation? (G) Learning a new combination of vocalizations experiment: The marmoset will be rewarded if it manages to
reproduce the artificial sequence that will be played back, composed of two different vocalizations (phee + twitter, in red). (H) Simple combinatorial symbolization.
The experiment involves learning to produce a different number of phee pulses to obtain rewards of different appetitive value. Shifts in the distribution of phee pulses
will be expected depending on the contingency established. (I) Complex combinatorial symbolization. The experiment involves learning to produce different
combinations of call types to obtain rewards of different appetitive value (in this example, phees and twitters). Shifts in the distribution of call sequences will be
expected depending on the contingency established.
and longer calls (Sutton et al., 1973). After 3–4 weeks of training,
two of the subjects increased their average number of calls per
session, and all three showed an increase in call duration. Pierce
(1985) reviewed 12 early attempts to condition the vocalizations
of non-human primates and came to the conclusion that they
indeed have a considerable amount of control over their own vocal
output. However, as in the study from Sutton et al. (1973), several
of the results mentioned by Pierce (1985) could possibly be caused
by motivational factors instead of learned vocal control.
Criticism: Observational Studies
A major problem with field studies is that they are purely
observational, and thus allow for a whole slew of confounding
variables to affect the results. For example Arcadi (1996)
and Mitani et al. (1999) showed that acoustic features of
the pant-hoot in chimpanzees varies between geographically
separated populations. This variation has been interpreted by
other authors as an indication that vocal development in
chimpanzees involves learning (e.g., Arcadi, 1996). However,
careful analysis of a number of environmental factors suggests that
the acoustic difference between calls from the two groups does
not have to be an effect of learning. For example, the two groups
lived in different habitats with different acoustics due to varying
density and type of forestation (i.e., primary versus secondary
forest), and thus the observed differences in the calls could instead
reflect adaptations to different acoustic environments. Further,
the amount of interfering noise the pant hoots were subjected
to differed according to varying levels of biodiversity in the two
habitats. Also the average body size likely differed between the
two groups, with corresponding changes in the acoustic features
of the calls that depend on body size. Finally, the two groups
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org October 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 15196
Turesson and Ribeiro Vocal conditioning in marmosets
were separated by such a large geographical distance that between-
group genetic differences could not be excluded (Mitani et al.,
1999). Thus, what superficially seemed to imply some form of
vocal learning, might only be a consequence of environmental
factors.
Criticism: Motivational Factors
A recurrent problem in many of the studies, both on vocal
production learning, and vocal usage, is the influence of the
motivational or arousal state (Owren et al., 2011; Hage et al.,
2013). A number of acoustic features vary with arousal level. For
example, call rate, fundamental frequency and call duration all go
up with increased arousal (Rendall, 2003). The level of arousal,
in turn, can be influenced by a number of factors, including
changes in social context and food (Braesicke et al., 2005; De
Marco et al., 2011; Machado et al., 2011). Thus, when the animal’s
context changes this can induce changes in arousal level, and
consequently also in some acoustic properties of the calls. To avoid
this, utmost care needs be taken to dissociate motivational factors
from experimental manipulations and measures.
To date, this has not been systematically done. For example,
Sutton et al. (1973) demonstrated that the duration of the coo call
in rhesus monkeys increased during a conditioning experiment.
The coo call is produced in multiple contexts, and among them
when food is available (Hauser and Marler, 1993). Since call
duration increases with arousal, and arousal can increase in the
presence of food, it is not unlikely that what appears as the subjects
learning to produce longer calls for reward ismerely amatter of the
subjects learning to associate a particular context with food, and
that this increases arousal. Similar alternative explanations can be
leveraged to most published studies (see Owren et al., 2011; Hage
et al., 2013, for a list of several of these studies).
At present, the most convincing study on vocal conditioning
in non-human primates comes from Hage et al. (2013). They
trained two rhesus monkeys to produce vocalizations for reward
in the presence of a visual cue. One of the two subjects was
further trained to produce two different vocalizations, coo and
grunt. Which of the two calls was rewarded in a particular trial
was indicated by two distinct visual cues. The subject learned
to do this and, within the same experimental session, produced
nearly exclusively coo calls when the cue indicated so, and grunts
when that was indicated. Very few calls were produced in the
wrong context. Even though both calls can be considered to be
food associated (Hauser and Marler, 1993; Owren and Casale,
1994)—and thus to reflect arousal—the amount and type of
reward was equal in both conditions. This means that food-
related arousal should also be equal across conditions, and thus
it cannot explain the differential calling depending on the visual
cue presented.Hage et al. (2013) represent the only clear exception
in the literature, which is otherwise confounded by arousal effects.
In summary, in face of the numerous books and review articles
written on the evolutionary history of human speech in general
and vocal flexibility in non-human primates in particular, it
is surprising that better-controlled methods for characterizing
the limits of vocal learning in non-human animals have not
been developed. Nearly all the positive evidence lack appropriate
controls to rule out confounding effects such as differences in
body weight, habitat, and most importantly motivation. Future
studies must be designed to effectively dissociate motivational
effects from the observable changes in vocal usage andproduction.
The best would be to show that the vocal modifications
could be driven in two opposite directions by equally arousing
context/social environments. In the next section we present some
key methodological improvements in this regard.
If a Marmoset Could Speak, We Should
Strive to Understand
A large body of evidence indicates that human language shares
many features with communication in other animals, and that
the greatest differences lie in the superior human capacity
for symbolic compositionality, fast vertical transmission
of new symbols, and irreversible accumulation of novel
adaptive behaviors that characterizes a cultural ratchet. We
hypothesize that increasingly-complex vocal conditioning of
an appropriate animal model may be sufficient to trigger a
semiotic ratchet, evidenced by progressive sign complexification,
as spontaneous contact calls become indexes, then symbols, and
finally arguments.
An adequate animal model for testing this hypothesis should
be amenable to laboratory research, have a rich vocal repertoire,
and show prosocial behavior characterized by cooperative
signaling and parental scaffolding. There is a continuum across
primates regarding the importance of posterior–anterior cortical
interactions for the perception and production of vocalizations,
by way of the arcuate fasciculus (Rilling et al., 2008). Regions
homologous to theWernicke area for speech perception have been
identified in chimpanzees (Gannon et al., 1998), while regions
homologous to the Broca area for orofacial control and speech
production have been recognized even in the common marmoset
(Callithrix jacchus; Miller et al., 2010; Simões et al., 2010) a highly
vocal New World monkey species split from Old World monkeys
around 40 million years ago (Worley et al., 2014).
Marmosets are cooperative breeders (Koenig, 1995), prosocial
(Burkart et al., 2007; Burkart and van Schaik, 2013), and capable
of attributing intentions to conspecifics (Burkart et al., 2012).
Similarly to the development of human speech (Goldstein and
Schwade, 2008), the maturation of vocal communication in
marmosets depends on parental scaffolding, in the form of
contingent vocal (social) feedback that seems to shape the
transition to adult vocalizations (Takahashi et al., 2013, 2015).
These findings point to marmosets as an adequate animal model
for the investigation of the development of indexical, symbolic,
and argumental communication.
Belowwe outline a series of conditioning experiments designed
to test the semiotic ratchet hypothesis in marmosets: Is it possible
to trigger a cultural ratchet by rewarding specific individual
vocalizations, so as to gradually build meaning? The experiments
described in Figure 2 aim to investigate the experimental and
possibly natural occurrence of indexes and symbols inmarmosets,
based on the timing of auditory and visual events, such a
gaze orientation, vocalization, and appetitive behavior. The
experiments were designed to effectively dissociate motivational
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effects from learning-related vocal changes, are suitable for
a graph-theoretical analysis of the structure of vocalization
sequences, and allow for the investigation of shared intentionality
within and across social groups.
The first step is vocal conditioning, using the real-time
detection of specific calls from a specific individual to deliver
reward (Figure 1). Conditioning will be conducted so as to
effectively dissociate motivational effects from learning-related
vocal changes, first rewarding animals for producing multiple
pulses in tandem, and then alternating to the exclusive reward of
single-pulse calls. This should lead to substantial variations in the
number of pulses produced, providing a direct control for arousal
effects.
We will then initiate a series of experiments that take
advantage of inter-animal differences in social rank and kinship,
comparing results obtained from pairs of animals within and
across families. These experiments involve imitation (Figure 2A),
soft and hard generosity (Figures 2B,C), envy (Figure 2D),
collaboration (Figure 2E), competition (Figure 2F), and learning
a new combination of vocalizations (Figure 2G). In all these
experiments the role of prosociality will be assessed within and
across families. These experiments propose to push the envelope
of the complexity of these vocal interactions, measuring the extent
of their constraint by social bonds.
We predict that calls will be at first interpreted as prospective
indexes of rewards, initially surprising but very reliable, until
by sheer repetition the call will transit into a dicent symbol of
the reward, to be used voluntarily even in the absence of any
appetitive drive (e.g., Figure 2C). Experimenting with gradually
longer delays between call and reward should also favor symbolic
emergence, due to the ever-increasing duration of the time spent
in the absence of the object. A further step would be to explore the
potential for combinatory semantics in the marmoset, by offering
a variety of different rewards for either phee calls of different pulse-
lengths (Figure 2H), or specific combinations of phee calls and
another call type, the twitter (Figure 2I).
In summary, we propose that conditioning experiments can
provide a fertile empirical framework for the investigation of
vocal communication in non-human primates, going beyond
perceptual learning to investigate two main directions, namely
the emergence of symbolic competence, and the possible capacity
for the production of arguments, i.e., symbolic combinatorial
sequences. To test whether a semiotic cultural ratchet was indeed
triggered, we will assess whether vocal conditioning becomes
faster over time, with an acceleration of cultural transmission
across generations. The cultural transmission of correct task
execution from parents to infants even without explicit training
would be a strong indication that a ratchet has been initiated.
Another prediction made by the semiotic ratchet hypothesis is
the absence of cultural fallbacks, i.e., once established, a new
conditioned communication system should remain stable.
The experiments proposed here also have the potential to
serve as a naturalistic behavioral setting for the investigation
of language disorders. Structural features of pathological
speech in humans, such as the reduced connectivity of
the discourse among patients with schizophrenia or bipolar
disorder (Mota et al., 2012, 2014), or the reduced density
and diameter of speech graphs produced by patients with
Alzheimer’s disease (Bertola et al., 2014), have great potential as
biomarkers for a dense quantitative screening of language deficit
phenotypes in transgenic marmosets (Shen, 2013). Animals
with autistic phenotypes should display great difficulty in
learning tasks with an important social aspect (Figures 2A–F)
while possibly performing well in solo tasks (Figures 2G–I).
Ultimately, understanding the processes that generate complex
vocal communication in primates may prove crucial to our
understanding of the evolution of human language, while at
the same time shedding light on the mechanisms underlying its
disorders.
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